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BLUE SKY LAW-SELLER'S DEFENSE OF ESTOPPEL
Plaintiff sought to rescind a sale of stock alleging it had not been
registered as required by the Florida Blue Sky Law." The defendant
pleaded estoppel, claiming the plaintiff had participated as a director in
the defendant-corporation after becoming a stockholder. The circuit court
sustained this defense and dismissed the action. Held, affirmed: the right
of a purchaser to recover the consideration paid for unregistered securities
is subject to the defense of estoppel when the statute provides for an
avoidance of the sale at the election of the purchaser. Popper v. Havana
Publications, Inc., 122 So.2d 247 (Fla. App. 1960).
Estoppel is one of several defenses permitted by some jurisdictions in
voidable sales of unregistered securities. 2 Despite this overall acceptance,
however, there remains an area of serious disagreement within these
jurisdictions. It concerns the standard of conduct, i.e., the degree of less
than innocent behavior required of the buyer before any defense may be
invoked. This dispute can be seen most clearly in the decisions involving
the purchaser's participation in the affairs of the seller. A few cases have
held that inducing another to purchase shares of the same unregistered
4
stock,3 and examining the records of the seller after the purchase, have
not barred an action for rescission by the,, purchaser. Yet, there are a
number of decisions allowing estoppel as a defense simply because the
purchaser accepted and retained profits distributed by the corporate vendor.,
As the degree of participation becomes more wilful, correspondingly,
the courts have become increasingly amenable to the interposition of
defenses preventing recovery. Personal participation in the business and
election meetings of the corporate vendor have been held to validate a
previously voidable sale," although merely executing a proxy ballot has not
always estopped a purchaser from later recovery. 7 When the purchaser
was one of the incorporators of a company, and later subscribed to an
offering of its stock, he was held liable for his unpaid subscription, the
1. Sale of Securities Act, FLA. STAT. ch. 517 (1959).
2. Among those other affirmative defenses which have been raised are: laches, Cummings v. Hotchkin Co., 292 Mass. 78, 197 N.E. 473 (1935); Farrar v. Hood, 56 N.M.
724, 249 P.2d 759 (1952); De Lamar Mines v. Mackay, 104 F.2d 271 (9th
Cir. 1939); release, Foreman v. Holsman, 10 11.2d 551, 141 N.E.2d 31 (1957); in
pari delicto, Gormly v. Dickenson, 2 Cal. Rptr. 650 (1960); Stonehocker v. Cassano,
154 Cal. App. 732, 316 P.2d 717 (1957).
3. Gales v. Weldon, 282 S.W.2d 522 (Mo. 1955); Schmidt v. Stortz, 208 Mo.
App. 439, 236 S.W. 694 (1922).
4. Harvey v. Electric Refrigeration Corp., 246 Mich. 235, 224 N.W. 443 (1929).
5. Farmers' Union Co-op Royalty Co. v. Little, 182 Okla. 178, 77 P.2d 33 (1938);
Good v. Starker, 216 Wis. 253, 257 N.W. 299 (1934); Wichita Duntile Co. v. Wright,
130 Kan. 139, 285 Pac. 635 (1930); Thomas v. United Royalty Co., 180 Okla. 230,
68 P.2d 490(1937); Brown Memorial Foundation v. Rohrer, 152 Kan. 291, 103 P.2d
814 (1940); Cummings v. Hotchkin Co., 292 Mass. 78, 197 N.E. 473 (1935).
6. Kaye v. Sunbeam Quarrie Co., 258 Ky. 190, 79 S.W.2d 700 (1935); Winfred
Farmers' Co. v. Smith, 47 S.D. 498, 199 N.W. 477 (1924).
App. 119 (1928); Edward v. Ioor, 205 Mich, 617,
7. Bunge v. Kirchhoff, 251 Ill.
172 N.W. 620 (1919).
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court holding that it was his responsibility to see that the stock was
properly registered for sale. 8 The same reasoning was applied to estop the
director of a corporation from avoiding her subscription pledge when she
knew of the illegality of the sale at the time of the purchase. 9 When, as
in the instant case,' 0 the buyer became a director of the corporate vendor
after the purchase had been innocently made, recovery of the purchase
price was not permitted because of the implied knowledge of the illegality
of the sale imputed to the buyer by reason of his familiarity with the
business dealings of his employer. 1
There are several jurisdictions which have refused to sanction any defenses preventing recovery, regardless of the conduct or position of the
purchaser prior to his suit for rescission. Their rationale is illustrated in
the New York case of Garey v. Perez F. Huff Co., 12 where it was pointed out
that the Blue Sky Law was solely for the protection of the investing public,
and since all the sanctions were imposed upon the fraudulent vendor,
rescission should be allowed in every case when it was requested by the
buyer. 13 This position has been sustained in situations when the buyer and
seller were particeps criminis,14 and joint adventurers.' 5
Illinois has ruled consistently in favor of the purchaser, disregarding
assertions that he actively controlled the stock, 16 that he signed a waiver of
liability, 17 and that he participated as an officer of the corporate vendor.18
Arizona is another jurisdiction sustaining the theory that no guilt adheres
by virtue of association. Its courts have reasoned that the purchaser's
acceptance of a position with the vendor was probably a part of the consideration offered for the sale. Rather then penalize the buyer for fulfilling
his part of the bargain, the court has held the inducer liable.' 9
The instant case is the first one in which a Florida court has interpreted
the "voidable at the election of the purchaser" section of the Florida Blue
Sky Law.20 In an extremely terse opinion its conclusions were that:

8. Norton v. Lamb, 144 Kan. 665, 62 P.2d 1311 (1936).
9. In re Groenleer-Vance Furniture Co., 23 F. Supp. 713 (W.D. Mich. 1938).
10. Popper v. Havana Publications, Inc., 122 So.2d 247 (Fla. App. 1960).
11. Guynn v. Schulters, 223 Miss. 232, 78 So.2d 114 (1955); Moore v. Manufacturers Sales Co., 335 Mich. 606, 56 N.W.2d 397 (1953); Schrier v. B & B Oil Co.,
311 Mich. 118, 18 N.W.2d 392 (1945).
12. 135 Misc. 138, 238 N.Y. Supp. 38 (Sup. Ct. 1930).
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Covert v. Cross, 331 S.W.2d 576 (Mo. 1960).
16. Bunge v. Kirchhoff, 251 Ill. App. 119 (1928).
17. Foreman v. Holsman, 101 1ll.2d 551, 141 N.E.2d 31 (1957).
18. Hudson v. Silver, 273 Il. App. 40 (1933).
19. Reilly v. Clyne, 27 Ariz. 432, 234 Pac. 35 (1925); United Bank & Trust Co.
v.loyner, 40 Ariz. 229, 11 P.2d 829 (1932); Trump v. Badet, 84 Ariz. 319, 327 P.2d
1001 (1958). See also Brannan, Beckham & Co. v. Ramsaur, 41 Ga. App. 166, 152
S.E. 282 (1930), where the court did not find facts sufficient to constitute estoppel in
a situation similar to the instant case.
20. FLA. STAT. § 517.21 (1959).
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The weight of authority appears to recognize the availability of
estoppel as a defense under a statute such as that involved here by
which such sales are not made void but voidable at the election
of the purchaser . .

.

.The majority of the cases, and we feel the

better reason, hold that under statutes worded as the Florida
Statute is framed, estoppel 21may be a defense and we follow and
apply that rule in this case.
The facts through which the trial court found conduct amounting
to an estoppel were left undiscussed by the appellate court. 22 It deferred
in its review to those "applicable authorities"' 23 cited in its opinion, most
of which had held, in varying degrees, that direct participation by the purvendor was conduct sufficient
chaser in the business affairs of a corporate
24
to estop any later action of rescission.
Properly viewed, the contention that the Blue Sky Laws were enacted
solely for the protection of the investing public is not tenable. Very rarely
is all the right on one side. Rather, it would seem that these laws were
passed to regularize and make more secure the business of selling securities,
much as insurance laws regulate the sale of insurance. To do this, protections
must be extended to both contracting parties, and both must conform to
similar standards of fair dealing. If the legal protections were all on one
side and the standards of conduct were legislatively unbalanced, then
remedial action protecting the seller of securities would soon be necessary.
It is far better that this result be achieved within the existing legal framework than to rely on piecemeal legislation.
HERBERT STETTIN

VENUE - CONTRACT FOR
SALE OF REAL PROPERTY
The plaintiff-vendor filed a complaint and good faith affidavit in the
Circuit Court of Manatee County, seeking specific performance of a contract
for the sale of realty located in Manatee County. The defendant moved
to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the residence of the parties
and the transaction giving rise to the action were both situated in Pinellas
21. Popper v. Havana Publications, Inc., 122 So.2d 247, 248 (Fla. App. 1960).
22. Id. at 249.
23. Popper v. Havana Publications, Inc., 122 So.2d 247 (Fla. App. 1960).
24. De Lamar Mines of Mont. v. Mackay, 104 F.2d 271 (9th Cir. 1939); Brown
Memorial Foundation v. Robrer, 152 Kan. 291, 103 P.2d 814 (1940); Fitch v. United
Royalty Co., 143 Kan. 486, 55 P.2d 409 (1936); Kaye v. Sunbeam Quarries Co., 258
Ky. 190, 79 S.W.2d 700 (1935); De Polo v. Greig, 338 Mich. 703, 62 N.W.2d 441
1954); Moore v. Manufacturers Sales Co., 335 Mich. 606, 56 N.W.2d 397 (1953);
chrier v. B & B Oil Co., 311 Mich. 118, 18 N.W.2d 392 (1945); Thomas v. United
Royalty Co., 180 Okla. 230, 68 P.2d 490 (1937).

